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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - TAXATION - PowER OF BoARD 'l·o AooPT
RULES AND REGULATIONS - INFLEXIBILITY OF PRIOR RULING BY REENACTMENT OF STATUTE WITHOUT CHANGE - The respondent oil company in
computing its net income for the years 1929-1930 for the purpose of applying
the depletion deduction provisions of the Revenue Act of 1928 1 refused to
deduct certain development expenditures, although it had deducted those development expenditures in computing its taxable net income for these years.
Under the rule-making power of section 2 3 ( r) of that act, the commissioner
defined "net income of the taxpayer" as used in section 114 (b )(3) as meaning gross income from the sale of gas and oil less certain deductions, including
development expenses (if the taxpayer had elected to deduct development expenses rather than charging them to capital account returnable through depletion). 2 The depletion provision of the Revenue Act of 1928 was substantially the
same as the 1921 Act,8 the 1924 Act;' and the 1926 Act. 11 Under the Acts of
1921 and 1924, the admitted Treasury practice was to permit net income from
the property for the purposes of depletion to be computed without regard to development expenditures, that practice being embodied in a ruling under the Act
of 1924.6 In a controversy to determine whether respondent was compelled to deduct development expenses to reach net income for the purposes of depletion, the
Board of Tax Appeals held for respondent/ deciding that the prior Treasury
ruling had received judicial sanction under the 1926 Act 8 and had been adopted
by Congress by the reenactment of the same provision in the 1928 Act. The
decision was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,9 one judge
dissenting, upon the theory that Congress by repeated reenactment of the provision adopted the prior ruling as the proper expression of legislative intent. The
Supreme Court reversed and held for the commissioner, deciding that the rule
1 45 Stat. L. 791 at 800, § 23 (1), provides: "In the case of mines, oil and gas
wells, other natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable allowance for depletion and for
depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case; such
reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under rules and regulations to be prescribed
by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary."
45 Stat. L. 791 at 822, § II4 (b) (3): "In the case of oil and gas wells the
allowance for depletion shall be 27,¼ per centum of the gross income from the property
during the taxable year. Such allowance not to exceed 50 per centum of the net income
of the taxpayer (computed without allowance for depletion) from the property, except
that in no case shall the depletion allowance be less than it would be if computed without reference to this paragraph."
2 Treas. Reg. 74, art. 221 (i) (1931).
8 42 Stat. L. 227 at 256, § 234 (a) (9).
'43 Stat. L. 253 at 260, § 204 (c).
11 44 Stat. L. 9 at 16, § 204 (c} (2).
6 Treas. Reg. 65, art. 201 (h) (1924).
7 Wilshire Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 450 (1937).
8 Ambassador Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) 81 F. (2d}
474•
11 Commissioner v. Wilshire Oil Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 971.
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of statutory construction contended for is not so inflexible as to preclude a change
of interpretation through the exercise of rule-making power. Helvering v.
Wilshire Oil Co., (U. S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 18.
It has been a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that contemporaneous interpretation of a statute by the officers charged with its administration is entitled to great weight.10 And in accord therewith is the view that
the reenactment of a statute which has been construed by the executive department, or the courts of last resort, is indicative of the intent of the legislature to
adopt such construction.11 The extent to which the federal courts would follow
this rule was somewhat clouded. by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 2 wherein it was held that a subsequent amended Treasury ruling would not be applied retroactively after
repeated reenactment without substantial change of the statute after the prior
ruling. This and other decisions have made it appear likely that a court might
through such a rule of construction impair the flexibility of the administrative
process.18 While the rule contended for by respondent in the principal case is
hedged .with exceptions and qualifications 14 it is submitted that such excep10 Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 34 S. Ct. 685 (1914); Swendig v. Washington
Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322, 44 S. Ct. 496 (1923); 59 C. J. 1025 (1932).
11 United States v. G. Falk & Brother, 204 U. S. 143, 27 S. Ct. 191 (1907);
United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U. S. 337, 28 S. Ct. 532
(1908); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 40 S. Ct. 237 (1920);
Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 50 S. Ct. II5 (1930); United States v. DakotaMontana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 53 S. Ct. 435 (1933); 59 C. J. 1061 (1932).
12
306 U.S. 110 at 117, 59 S. Ct. 423 (1939), stating: "We need not now
determine whether, as has been suggested, the alteration of the existing rule, even for
the future, requires a legislative declaration or may be shown by reenactment of the
statutory provision unaltered after a change in the applicable regulation." The case is
commented on in 39 CoL. L. REV. 716 (1939), and 33 ILL. L. REV. 468 (1939)
(circuit court decision).
18 "But in any event it seems to us that the uniform interpretation, so long placed
upon § 22(a) ••• by the regulation and confirmed by the inaction of Congress, was
imbedded in the statute so deep that only legislation could dislodge it." Justice Learned
Hand in E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Helvering, (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 69 at 70,
where confronted with the problem of the Reynolds case. But compare with that Justice
Hand's language in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) 91
F. (2d) 973 at 976, cert. denied, 302 U. S. 768, 58 S. Ct. 479 (1938): "But not
every ruling is incorporated in the text because it is not repudiated; no one ever
suggested anything of the sort. At most, administrative practice "is a weight in the scale,
to be considered, but not to be inevitably followed. • •• To suppose that Congress
must particularly correct each mistaken construction under penalty of incorporating it
into the fabric of the statute appears to us unwarranted; our fiscal legislation is detailed
and specific enough already."
14 No adoption if the administrative construction is erroneous, United States v.
Missouri Pacific R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 49 S. Ct. 133 (1929); or if the statute needed
no construction as not being ambiguous, 59 C. J. 1065 (1932); or if the administrative construction is not uniform, ibid. The regulation must be in harmony with the
statute and be reasonable, otherwise no adoption. Manhattan General Equipment Co.
v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397 (1936).
The reason for the rule is the inference drawn from the fact that the legislators,
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tions and the rule itself are hypertechnical and should be handled advisedly
in view of the nature of the demands made upon administrative tn'bunals.
The rule would be especially burdensome in a situation such as that in
the principal case involving the administration of a revenue statute, for
the effect would be to require Congressional approval of administrative rulings
in a .field where ease of adjustment to change is needed to meet new and
emergency situations. The rule is not questioned here as an instrument, i.e., as
an aid, to a court in attempting to reach the intent of a legislature. However,
it is submitted that the rule has no place as a limitation upon the power of an
administrative agency to make rules and regulations in the administration of a
15
revenue measure.
William F. Anderson

knowing of the administrative construction, must have approved of it or otherwise they
would have made correcting amendments. Mayes v. Paul Jones & Co., (C. C. A. 6th,
1921) 270 F. 121.
15 " • • • the Treasury Department was authorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act within the permissible bounds of administrative construction. Nor can
this authority be deemed to be so restricted that the regulations, once issued, could not
later be- clarified or enlarged so as to meet administrative exigencies or conform to
judicial decision." Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 at 354-355, 56 S. Ct.
289 (1935). See also Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299, 53 S. Ct. 161 (1932),
where the repeated reenactment of the revenue statute without substantial change did
not prevent the Treasury Department from deriving a new formula for reasonable
allowance.

